Most Ukrainians believe that partners are not doing enough for Ukraine’s victory – survey
At the request of the New Europe Center, INFO Sapiens LLC has researched the opinions of Ukrainians on security issues, in particular:
- What do you consider the best “security guarantee” for Ukraine?
- Should Ukraine negotiate with Russia if it does not receive security guarantees from the West?
- Under what circumstances should Ukraine negotiate with Russia?
- What concessions do you consider acceptable in peace talks with Russia?
- Do you support Ukraine’s gradual accession to NATO if Ukraine is invited to join within internationally recognized borders, but if Article 5 applies to the whole of Ukraine, except for the temporarily occupied territories?
- Can Ukraine become a member of the EU without membership in NATO?
- When do you think Ukraine will become a member of the EU?
- What do you think about when you hear EU and US representatives pointing to corruption in Ukraine?
- In your opinion, are the partners doing everything possible for Ukraine’s victory?
- Can Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan lead to a just peace?
- Which foreign leader do you trust the most?
The results of the survey are available here.
SUMMARY
A mixture of disappointment and optimism. More faith in ourselves than in our partners. These are probably the two key impressions from the results of a new survey commissioned by the New Europe Center and conducted by our longtime partners, INFO Sapiens. We have been conducting such final annual surveys since the end of 2021. If we compare the latest and last year’s surveys, we can see quite significant changes in attitudes.
Overall, trust in Western leaders has fallen. The majority of Ukrainians believe that their partners are not doing enough to ensure Ukraine’s victory. The number of Ukrainians who believed in the effectiveness of Western pressure to fight corruption has slightly decreased. All of these are rather disturbing signals amid incessant talk about the possible termination of support for Ukraine and the coercion of Ukrainians to make concessions to Russia.
At the same time, most Ukrainians see no point in negotiations with Moscow, as they believe that it will still resort to new aggression after a short pause. The respondents allow for negotiations only if Russia proves its commitment to peace (withdraws its troops) or if Western partners provide Ukraine with reliable security guarantees. We can see that Ukrainians have become somewhat more open to some compromises in possible negotiations with the aggressor country, but this does not apply, for example, to issues such as granting Russian the status of an official language or reducing the size of the Armed Forces.
However, in general, Ukrainians remain optimistic about the vector to the West. Ukrainians support the country’s accession to NATO, in particular, for the first time, there is high support for gradual accession to the Alliance, which provides for an invitation to Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and the application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on all territories except the temporarily occupied ones.
Many respondents believe that Ukraine will join the EU soon enough (within five years). The champions of public trust among foreign leaders are European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Polish President Andrzej Duda. The only Western leader whose trust has increased over the past year is French President Emmanuel Macron. The leaders of the United States, Joseph Biden and Olaf Scholz of Germany, showed the sharpest decline in their indicators over the past year. Paradoxically, the leaders of the countries that have helped Ukraine the most seem to have become the biggest disappointment of Ukrainians – perhaps because they have the most responsibility. On the positive side: The EU, NATO, and the G7 have a high level of trust among Ukrainians. On the negative side, but expected: The UN and the OSCE are completely discredited in the eyes of the organization’s respondents.
KEY FINDINGS
THE BEST GUARANTEE OF SECURITY IS NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO
Ukrainians surveyed consider the development of nuclear weapons by the state (31.3%) and gradual accession to NATO (29.3%) to be the best guarantees of Ukraine’s security. Other options for guaranteeing security are less popular. In particular, 11.2% of respondents believe in the effectiveness of a defense alliance with the United States, 8.9% of Ukrainians are ready to rely on UN peacekeepers, and even fewer respondents believe in the effectiveness of European troops on the territory of Ukraine – only 6.4%. It cannot be ruled out that the answers were also influenced by the opinion of how realistic this or that option is. In any case, the trend toward self-sufficiency is noticeable: in recent years, Ukrainians have associated their main security expectations primarily with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and then with partnership opportunities. The almost identical rates of support for the development of Ukrainian nuclear weapons and NATO membership may demonstrate the struggle between two main approaches – between a sovereignist approach to strengthening security and a belief in collective defense.
SKEPTICISM ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA
64.1% of Ukrainians believe that negotiations with Russia are not worthwhile unless Ukraine receives real security guarantees from the West. The argument is that Russia will start a war again after a short pause. About 30% of respondents are in favor of negotiations in any case, as they believe Ukraine does not have the resources for a war of attrition. In general, Ukrainians are mostly skeptical of “negotiations for the sake of negotiations.” The age group of 30-39 years old is most in favor of negotiations (almost 40%). The regional dimension of supporters of negotiations is as follows: Kyiv is the most distrustful (only 18%), almost the same number in the West (20%), and the majority of supporters in the South and East – 34.5% and 43.7% respectively.
WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY GUARANTEES FIRST, THEN NEGOTIATIONS
Almost 40% of respondents believe that Ukraine should negotiate only when Russia withdraws its troops (at least to the positions before February 24, 2022). Another 26.2% of Ukrainians believe that a precondition for negotiations should be security guarantees from Western countries, which would make it impossible to repeat the aggression. Not to negotiate with Russia under any circumstances – this option was chosen by 12.1% of respondents. It is noteworthy that last year’s survey (“On the Preconditions for Negotiations, ‘Security Assurances’ and Trust in Foreign Leaders – a Survey”, New Europe Center, December 5, 2023) recorded a more than twice as high level of those who chose the same intransigent position – 33.4%. Thus, we are seeing an increase in supporters of the negotiation process, but only if there are proper preconditions and circumstances. Negotiations without any preconditions are supported by only 16% of respondents.
NO CONCESSIONS, BUT…
“New Europe asked respondents to assess the possibility of certain concessions in peace talks with Russia. The main conclusion is that most Ukrainians do not accept concessions to the Russians. However, compared to last year, we see a certain softening of the respondents’ position. In particular, this year 53.2% of respondents believe that it is unacceptable to give up the reconquest of the occupied territories. A year ago, this figure was 76.2%, a decrease of more than 20 percentage points. Last year, 56.9% of Ukrainians did not accept the refusal to join NATO, this year – 48.7%. Last year, 61% of respondents ruled out joining the EU altogether, and now 50.7% do. The level of those who strongly opposed the refusal to prosecute Russian leaders and war criminals (77%, 68.4%) decreased by 10%. The indicator of the impossibility of reducing the amount of reparations from Russia has changed slightly. The high level of unacceptability of concessions remains with regard to granting the Russian language state status (70.9%) and reducing the Ukrainian army (74.5%). The language and the army are apparently perceived as the existential foundations of the state, which cannot be the subject of any discussions with other states.
OVERWHELMING MAJORITY IN FAVOR OF GRADUAL ACCESSION TO NATO
70.3% of Ukrainians support the idea of Ukraine’s gradual accession to the Alliance when NATO invites Ukraine within internationally recognized borders (at the same time, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty would apply to the entire state, except for the temporarily occupied territories). The starting point of this model is the West German model of accession: recall that Germany became a member of NATO in 1955, but the country’s eastern states were able to join the Alliance only after German reunification in 1990. However, the essential difference between gradual and partial accession is that the invitation to NATO will apply not only to Ukraine without the temporarily occupied territories, as was the case in West Germany, but to the whole of Ukraine, including the occupied territories.
In the Ukrainian discourse over the past two years, the discussion has been focused on Ukraine’s partial accession to NATO, when the occupied territories are allegedly “given” to to Russia in exchange for NATO membership for the unoccupied territories. Of course, this option is not supported by Ukrainians in polls either. In fact, the point is that these territories are also invited to join the Alliance, but will only be able to be under the Alliance’s security umbrella after their de-occupation in the future. Over the past year, in our publications and comments, we have drawn attention to the difference between partial accession and gradual accession. As we can see, the majority of Ukrainians understand gradual accession.
WITH THE EU BUT WITHOUT NATO?
Most Ukrainians do not see any interdependence between joining NATO and the EU. 53.9% of respondents believe that Ukraine can become a member of the EU without joining NATO, as these are not related processes. However, more than a third of respondents (34.4%) think that Ukraine should first guarantee its security, which is possible only through NATO membership. EU representatives often admit that the European Union is not able to guarantee security to the extent that NATO can, despite the existence of its own analog of Article 5, Article 42.7, which is still actively invoked in those EU capitals that do not support or consider unrealistic Ukraine’s invitation to NATO. However, perhaps the best proof that Article 42.7 cannot guarantee the same security as Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is the decision of the formerly traditionally neutral EU members Sweden and Finland to become part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The high support for Ukraine’s EU membership without joining NATO may indicate a lack of public debate on the security preconditions for Ukraine’s movement and membership in the European Union. In fact, Kyiv also needs security guarantees to protect its accession to the EU.
34% OF SUPER-EURO-OPTIMISTS
More than one-third of Ukrainians (34%) believe that Ukraine will become a member of the EU within the next 5 years. The same optimistic timeline can be heard from representatives of the Ukrainian government. Instead, 17.2% of respondents chose a longer period – within the next 10 years. “As soon as the war is over” – 16.8% of respondents consider this scenario likely. More than ten years are expected to be spent on the path to membership by 11% of Ukrainians. There are not many outright skeptics among Ukrainians: only 13% of respondents believe that Ukraine will never become a member of the EU. The relative dispersion of opinions about the timeframe of our European course may indicate a certain “maturation” of Ukrainians who understand the complexities associated with joining the EU. On the one hand, it means a lot of domestic reform work that Ukraine will have to do in a timely manner. The opinion that the emphasis in joining the EU should be on defending Ukraine’s interests, not on speed, is also becoming more and more popular (“Public opinion poll for the EU Advisory Mission”, Sociological Group “Rating”, October 28, 2024). On the other hand, Ukrainians also see rather restrained reactions from the EU itself regarding the timing of the accession of candidate countries, and attempts to make future enlargement dependent on internal reforms in the Union.
SELF-CRITICISM ON THE WAY TO THE EU
63% of Ukrainians believe that we need pressure from the EU and the US to overcome corruption. Ukrainian politicians have often resorted to a standard practice at different times: as soon as foreign observers draw attention to corruption challenges, talk of interference in internal affairs immediately begins in Ukraine. “Isn’t there corruption in the EU?” – double standards are another favorite trick of defenders of the ”sovereignty of corruption.” At the same time, Ukrainian citizens were mostly skeptical of such arguments, seeing the EU and the US as reliable like-minded partners who would contribute to positive changes in Ukraine. As we can see, the high level of support for Western pressure on Ukrainian corrupt officials continues to be maintained, but we still observe a certain decline (last year the figure was seven percentage points higher). Votes in favor of Western pressure have shifted to other options. For example, support for the thesis “The EU and the US are looking for excuses to deny Ukraine more support” has increased by almost four percentage points. It seems that the slow and not always decisive assistance to Ukraine in the fight against Russian aggression may have influenced the assessment of Western partners’ actions in other areas, including the fight against corruption.
DISAPPOINTMENT WITH WESTERN PARTNERS
The majority of Ukrainians (57.2%) believe that our partners are not doing enough to ensure Ukraine’s victory. Almost 40% are convinced that our partners are doing everything possible for our victory. In many of the responses to this survey, we can see exhaustion and frustration among Ukrainians. The West’s “as long as it takes” approach to supporting Ukraine seems to be failing not only among experts but also among society at large. It is not clear how long and to what extent the West will be able to continue supporting Ukraine. Attempts by some Western politicians to reach an agreement with Putin (possibly at the cost of unacceptable concessions for Kyiv) are becoming more and more obvious. The premonitions of the worst are also affecting the assessments and moods of Ukrainians. This is very evident in the results of the next question about trust in foreign leaders.
FIVE FOREIGN LEADERS WHOM UKRAINIANS TRUST: URSULA VON DER LIEBEL, ANDRZEJ DUDA, JUSTIN TRUDEAU, EMMANUEL MACRON, MAYA SANDU
The leaders of public trust among Ukrainians are European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Polish President Andrzej Duda, who have virtually the same score (65%). Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is in third place (almost 60%). French President Emmanuel Macron is slightly behind him (58.4%). President of the Republic of Moldova Maia Sandu took fifth place (57.3%). Ursula von der Leyen’s championship is most likely a reflection of Ukrainians’ gratitude for the European Commission President’s efforts to promote Ukraine’s path to EU membership. Her undisputed leadership in securing key decisions for Ukraine at the EU level, combined with her deep understanding of the unprecedented security environment in which Ukraine is forced to start accession negotiations with the EU, is visible to ordinary Ukrainians.
Trust in the leadership of the Polish president is a tribute to tradition, as Ukrainian society perceives the Polish leader and Poland in general in a positive light (more so than Ukrainian political elites) by inertia. However, it is worth noting that, compared to the previous year, the decline in trust in the Polish president is more than obvious – by 13.1 percentage points. And if we compare it with the figure for 2022 (86.8%), when Andrzej Duda was the undisputed leader of Ukrainians’ trust, we can talk about a catastrophic drop in public sympathy (one in five Ukrainians has been disappointed in the Polish leader over the past three years). We would hazard a guess that the main explanations for the loss of trust in the Polish president are the unprecedented actions of blocking the state border, as well as statements by Polish politicians (not necessarily President Duda) on the topic of search and exhumation work in Ukraine and in the context of Poland’s continued support for Ukraine in issues that are critically important to it, including progress in accession negotiations with the EU.
At the same time, it is not entirely clear why Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is among the top three trust leaders. This assessment of Ukrainian society is at odds with the opinion of the New Europe Center’s experts, who believe that the country’s potential does not match the level of assistance it provided to Ukraine during a full-scale war. For example, Canada ranks 14th in terms of the share of assistance provided to Ukraine as a percentage of its GDP among other countries that help our country (0.421%) (Ukraine Support Tracker, Kiel Institute, 2024).
In terms of military aid as a share of GDP, Canada ranks 21st overall (0.134%). Also, Justin Trudeau was perhaps the only Western leader to support German Chancellor Scholz’s phone call to Vladimir Putin.
Biden and Scholz are losing credibility. There has been a marked decline in public trust in foreign leaders in general. While last year, US President Joseph Biden was the record holder in terms of trust with a score of almost 82%, now the leaders are “competing” for a level of trust of 65%. This reflects the general skepticism of Ukrainians in assessing the efforts of the international community (and the United States in particular) to support Ukraine. Most of the leaders saw a drop in their level of trust – while, for example, Biden had a score of almost 82% last year, this year it is 55.2% (a drop of 27 percentage points). Scholz had a trust level of 61.4%, and now it is 24.5 percentage points lower. One in four Ukrainians is disappointed in the leaders of the countries that provide the most assistance to Ukraine in absolute terms, but are still noticeably paralyzed in their decisions by the fear of Putin’s Russia, which undoubtedly affects the dosed amounts, slow pace, and types of assistance provided. Thus, it directly affects Ukraine’s ability not only to liberate the occupied territories but also to properly defend itself.
Positive dynamics – Macron and two “misunderstandings”. French President Emmanuel Macron was the only Western leader with positive dynamics, i.e., an increase in trust rather than a decline: last year, 54.5% trusted him, and this year – 58.4%. Although the increase was only four percentage points, it is not so bad compared to other leaders. It seems that Ukrainians have not overlooked Macron’s efforts to change the West’s strategy to support Ukraine, such as his clear position on inviting Ukraine to join NATO, the French leader’s initiative to send military components to Ukraine, and so on.
If we analyze the growth of support for all foreign leaders in general, we can see a slight increase in support for representatives of some hostile states. While in the case of Putin, it is more of a change within the margin of error, since the level of trust in him is still close to zero, the situation with Alexander Lukashenko is a bit different: about 3% of Ukrainians (the increase in trust) may have forgotten from whose territory Putin invaded in 2022. Perhaps the factor of gratitude that a ground invasion from Belarus and with the participation of Belarusian soldiers, the risks of which have been repeatedly reported in media publications over the past two years, never happened, also worked. Instead, there has been a certain change in Lukashenko’s rhetoric toward Ukraine, to a less hostile one.
Trump is “growing”. The rather high level of trust among Ukrainians in the new US President Donald Trump is noteworthy, especially against the backdrop of Joseph Biden’s falling approval ratings and given similar trust ratings in Europe. For example, in France, Trump was trusted by 16%, in Britain by 30%, and only Hungary looks the most favorable with 37% (Pew Research Center, Confidence in Donald Trump, 2024), which is still less than the level of trust among Ukrainians – 44.6%. Presumably, this high level of support is due to the expectation of a clearer and more decisive policy toward Ukraine from the new US administration. It should also be taken into account that some respondents have certain hopes for the restoration of peace in Ukraine, which Trump emphasized during the election campaign. Obviously, Trump’s high level of trust may have been influenced by disappointment in the current US president, who recorded a significant drop in the indicator. Last year, by the way, we asked Ukrainians: “Who do you sympathize with more – Donald Trump or Joseph Biden?” The current president was the undisputed leader of sympathy with 78.1%. Only 10.1% of respondents preferred the leader of the Republican Party.
WESTERN ORGANIZATIONS ARE IN FAVOR, ESPECIALLY THE EU
Despite the fact that some of the responses in this survey indicate a certain disappointment of Ukrainians in the actions of the West, we also see a high level of trust in Western institutions. In particular, Ukrainians trust the following international organizations, groups, or associations the most: EU (69.2%), NATO (64.4%), and G7 (62.4%). Organizations whose direct responsibility is to protect Ukraine have low public trust. Trust in the UN is at 37.9%, and in the OSCE – 34.6%.
A PLAN FOR VICTORY: IT ALL DEPENDS ON THE WEST
A relative majority of Ukrainians (35.2%) do not know about the Victory Plan or do not understand the essence of the document. However, every third respondent (30.9%) realizes that the plan was created primarily for the West, which should support Ukraine more, so everything depends on our partners. The plan is considered unrealistic by 18.6% of respondents. Only 12.3% of Ukrainians believe that it will really lead to victory and peace.
The survey was conducted as part of a project supported by the International Renaissance Foundation. The conclusions of the material reflect the position of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.
Source: Ukrinform
