News

Why Russian soft power is a threat for both Ukraine and Europe

IRF Editor Europe and the World

Author: Volodymyr Yermolenko 

As part of our project “Eastern Part­ner­ship 2.0” we publish a series of arti­cles about the three EU asso­ci­a­ted states. The authors from the region (Mikheil Benidze, Volodymyr Yer­molenko, Victor Gotisan) analyze the impact of Russian soft power (fake news, media pro­pa­ganda and infor­ma­tion warfare) in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova from a civil society per­spec­tive.

When Euro­pean trav­ellers came to Ukraine in the 18th – 19th cen­turies, they were usually told the Russian version of the history of the Ukrain­ian lands. In this version of the story, one would hear little or nothing about Zaporozhian Cos­sacks, hetman-led Ukrain­ian state­hood in the 17th century, the dif­fi­cult but pro­duc­tive Ukrain­ian Ortho­dox-Catholic dia­logue or a Ukrain­ian her­itage of Rus’, a pow­er­ful Medieval state with the centre in Kyiv. Instead, one heard only a story about the glory of the Russian empire, or about a pan-Slavic idea that was des­tined to erase the dif­fer­ences among Slavic nations in the vast Russian state.

When Stal­in­ist col­lec­tiviza­tion and terror killed about 4 million Ukrain­ian peas­ants in 1932–1933, the Western world heard little about the tragedy (with the excep­tion of a few voices, like that of Gareth Jones). It heard about the “great terror” in the Soviet Union only around 1937, when it was tar­get­ing people in Moscow and Leningrad, though the major­ity of the Ukrain­ian intel­li­gentsia and mil­lions of ordi­nary Ukraini­ans had already been killed or sent to Soviet camps by that time.

Today, when you hear the Russian nar­ra­tive about the World War II, it tells you that Rus­sians suf­fered most during this tragedy and that they played the most impor­tant role in the victory over Nazism. You rarely hear that between 8 and 10 million inhab­i­tants of what is now Ukraine died during the war (a quarter of the pop­u­la­tion) or that about 7 million Ukraini­ans fought in the Red Army against the Nazis or that 3 to 4 million of them died in that fight –together with rep­re­sen­ta­tives of other nation­al­i­ties of the Soviet Union. Instead, Russia tries to monop­o­lize the history of the World War II and victory over Nazism.

You don’t hear all this because Russian soft power does exist – and it is capable of chang­ing the nar­ra­tives of entire nations, making them invis­i­ble to the world – and even to them­selves.

Today the power of Kremlin-led Russia is not only about tanks and mil­i­tary inva­sion, of the kind seen in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Apart from expan­sion­ist hard power, Kremlin also has soft power, a power that influ­ences minds, emo­tions and stories. This soft power is much stronger than people in the West tend to believe.

In Western coun­tries, there is a wide­spread idea that the goal of Russian soft power is to divide and polar­ize. Ukraine’s expe­ri­ence shows that this is only part of what these tactics are aimed at.

Indeed, the soft power of author­i­tar­ian regimes is usually focused along two main tracks: divide and conquer. In the Western world, which Russia finds dif­fi­cult to conquer, the empha­sis is on the “divide” track. This is why it is so con­cen­trated on polar­iza­tion there, the use and abuse of exist­ing con­flicts, the rad­i­cal­iza­tion of oppo­nents on all sides.

In Eastern Euro­pean – and par­tic­u­larly in Eastern Part­ner­ship – coun­tries, includ­ing Ukraine, the approach is much more ambi­tious. There, the Kremlin’s ulti­mate goal is to conquer (or re-conquer), not merely to divide. “Divide” tactics are employed as a part of this wider approach. But other com­po­nents are at work as well: cre­at­ing trust to gain an audi­ence, pro­duc­ing ani­mos­ity in order to then rad­i­cal­ize it, shaping the image of an enemy and, finally, shaping the image of a pos­si­ble pro­tec­tor.

Indeed, every “conquer” starts with  “divide”. And every act of divid­ing follows certain acts of prepa­ra­tion: “cre­at­ing trust” and gaining sup­port­ers. Trust must first be gen­er­ated for it to be used to promote divi­sions and to produce ani­mos­ity towards other groups. Once ani­mos­ity has been spread within society, it can be used to create an image of an enemy. And the final step is the cre­ation of a “pro­tec­tor” to defend one against the enemy. The example of Ukraine in the past years pro­vides an excel­lent case in point.

Let’s recall the story: in late 2013 – early 2014, Ukrain­ian society rose up against corrupt pro-Russian Pres­i­dent Victor Yanukovych in a protest that we call “Euro­maidan”, or the “Rev­o­lu­tion of Dignity”. After Yanukovych’s violent attempt to shut down the protest camp on the Maidan, which left to over a hundred dead, he left Ukraine, fleeing to Russia in Feb­ru­ary 2014. The Kremlin, exploit­ing the weak­ness of the Kyiv gov­ern­ment, ille­gally annexed Crimea in March 2014 and sent its proxies to launch the war in Donbas.

Under­stand­ably, pos­i­tive atti­tudes to Russia among Ukraini­ans fell dra­mat­i­cally: from over 90% to 30%. But signs of a Russian strat­egy to re-conquer the Ukrain­ian lands were present from very early on. A few infor­ma­tion chan­nels with unclear finances (112 Ukraine and NewsOne, for example) were created in 2013 and 2014. Rumour linked them to members of the entourage of the ousted pres­i­dent, Yanukovych, who still answered to Russia. Whether that was true or not, these chan­nels were ini­tially very inclu­sive in terms of their infor­ma­tion policy. They made room for all pos­si­ble sides and speak­ers: they were gen­er­at­ing trust and gaining the audi­ence.

In late 2018, word came out that these chan­nels, together with a few other ones, had been pur­chased by an MP close to Victor Medved­chuk, Putin’s key ally in Ukraine. From that moment onwards, their strat­egy shifted from “gen­er­at­ing trust” to “divid­ing”. They worked against the Maidan legacy, anti-cor­rup­tion reforms and Ukraine’s pro-EU vector. They con­tributed a great deal to the emer­gence of a feeling in Ukrain­ian society that the post-Maidan reforms were taking the country down the wrong path.

After the 2019 pres­i­den­tial and par­lia­men­tary elec­tion, which rad­i­cally changed the power equa­tion in Ukraine, bring­ing young come­dian Volodymyr Zelen­skyi and his party “Servant of the People” to the heights of power, the strat­egy of these TV chan­nels and of other media with pro-Russian and anti-Western rhetoric changed again. The climate of ani­mos­ity and polar­iza­tion having already been created, they started build­ing the image of the enemy. The general concept of this image was “exter­nal gov­er­nance”; the key sym­bolic figure: George Soros; and the key insti­tu­tional symbol: the IMF. Although Soros’ foun­da­tion – the “Inter­na­tional Renais­sance Foun­da­tion” – had been active in Ukraine since 1990 and had con­tributed to major pro-Euro­pean reforms in the country, Ukraine had never before seen “anti-Soros” pro­pa­ganda on such a large scale.

The primary goal of this approach is to equal­ize dangers in the minds of Ukrain­ian cit­i­zens. After 2014, Russia had become a danger: in 2009 59% of Ukraini­ans had a pos­i­tive atti­tude to Putin, in 2019 only 8% did. The actors behind Russian soft power under­stood that it would be dif­fi­cult to change this neg­a­tive image very quickly, but they saw a pos­si­bil­ity to create an “alter­na­tive” enemy: the West. Today, the pro­pa­ganda of the Kremlin and its proxies por­trays the West and “exter­nal gov­er­nance” as posing no less a danger to Ukraine than Russian aggres­sion. By so doing, it is helping to con­struct the myth that Ukraine is under threat from two direc­tions, which then will lead to the idea that the Russia does not actu­ally pose a real danger at all. Then it will all be the fault of the West, for having insti­gated a quarrel between the “broth­erly peoples”.

To under­stand the scale of the problem, it helps to look at some numbers. From January to June 2020, we (Internews Ukraine) spotted 79,811 mes­sages attack­ing Soros and his “agents” in 708 sources on the Ukrain­ian inter­net. Most of them were posted by pro-Russian actors; some orig­i­nated in pro-oli­garchic circles. We also tracked 12,678 mes­sages in 484 sources con­demn­ing the “exter­nal gov­er­nance” of Ukraine by the West.

The primary goal of the polit­i­cal and infor­ma­tion actors spread­ing these mes­sages is to under­mine Ukraine’s pro-Western vector. Apart from the war that Russia and its proxies are waging in Eastern Ukraine, Russia is also trying to win the hearts and minds of Ukraini­ans, to make them dis­ap­pointed in Euro­pean inte­gra­tion, and to win them back into the orbit of the “Russian world”. In many ways, it is suc­ceed­ing.

History teaches us that despite the emo­tional enthu­si­asm of Ukrain­ian upris­ings and inde­pen­dence efforts, Russian influ­ences can easily come back. It also teaches us that Russian expan­sion never stops at Ukraine. In the early 18th century, Ukrain­ian hetman Ivan Mazepa joined forces with the Swedish king Charles XII but was defeated near Poltava by the forces of Russia’s Peter I, marking the end of Ukraine’s auton­omy within the Russian Tsardom and opening the way for Russian expan­sion to the Black Sea and further west. In the early 19th century, the Decem­brist revolt in Saint Peters­burg had sub­stan­tial Ukrain­ian element; and its sup­pres­sion strength­ened the reac­tionary rule of the Russian tsar, who became one of the key leaders of the reac­tionary powers in Europe. In the early 20th century, Ukraine enjoyed a few years of inde­pen­dence but failed to defend it, unlike Poland and some of its other neigh­bours; when Stalin’s regime grew stronger after the victory over Nazism, Soviet/​Russian rule extended much further west­ward.

We don’t know whether Ukrain­ian state­hood, had it sur­vived, would have kept Europe safer from these reac­tionary dangers. It might have, though.

Today, Europe should be aware that the pos­si­bil­ity of a U‑turn is a very real one for Eastern Part­ner­ship coun­tries, even a country as advanced as Ukraine. And that the adver­sary is employ­ing vast resources, knowl­edge and infil­tra­tion to achieve just that. To prevent it, more action is needed. Pri­mar­ily in the form of giving Ukraine and other Eastern Part­ner­ship coun­tries a clearer and more tan­gi­ble per­spec­tive on their Euro­pean inte­gra­tion path. And making the Euro­pean inte­gra­tion of these coun­tries much more visible and tan­gi­ble for ordi­nary people.

Belarus protests show that Eastern Part­ner­ship is becom­ing a region where soci­eties increas­ingly want freedom and Euro­pean future. A process which started in Georgia and Ukraine in early 2000s, spilled over to Moldova and Armenia, and now to Belarus. All these rev­o­lu­tions are dif­fer­ent – but they have common traits. The whole region has changed – and Kremlin will obvi­ously not be willing to give it away. But despite its increas­ingly strong infor­ma­tion warfare, I do hope that history in this region is no longer on the Kremlin’s side.

Volodymyr Yer­molenko is a Ukrain­ian philoso­pher and jour­nal­ist, direc­tor for ana­lyt­ics at Internews Ukraine and chief editor at UkraineWorld.org

SOURCE

HOW TO APPLY?

Please complete the application form and submit it via your personal account. Applications are accepted exclusively in electronic form, and the assessment process involves several stages. 
Visit